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1 | INTRODUCTION
Exports play a crucial role in firms' growth. The most productive firms select into exporting and
end up serving multiple destinations, being able to cover the sunk costs of entry for each mar-
ket. This diversification of export markets not only contributes to the growth of the firm but also
hedges the risks of relying on a single export market. Thus, many countries have policies that
promote exports and export‐market diversification via subsidies for market research and interna-
tional trade fairs. The seminal paper by Roberts and Tybout (1997) established that there are
substantial costs of entry into new markets.1 Theoretical works by Melitz (2003), Helpman,
Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), Chaney (2008), and Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011) incorpo-
rated the extensive margin of trade into heterogeneous firms models by including a fixed cost of
exporting. Importantly, to explain the consumer extensive margin of trade, Arkolakis (2010) for-
malised a model that endogenises the entry cost by incorporating destination‐specific marketing
costs.2
The black box of entry costs created a literature on networks and how they can reduce trade
frictions by spreading information. Chaney (2014) built a model where firms acquire new cus-
tomers through their networks in existing export markets and thus enter into markets that are geo-
graphically closer to their existing destinations.3 The model predicts that firms can search for
clients remotely using their existing clients. Following his conjecture, this paper examines whether
firms use their existing suppliers in a destination to find their first clients in those markets based
1Other papers that find these costs include Bernard and Jensen (2004) for US firms, Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007) for
Colombian firms and Özler, Taymaz, and Yilmaz (2009) for Turkish firms. Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008), on the other
hand, find sunk costs for importing.
2From an empirical viewpoint, Gullstrand (2011) examined Swedish food exporters and found that export costs are firm‐des-
tination‐specific. Similarly, Moxnes (2010) discovered that market‐specific costs are about three times as large as global
exporting costs using Norwegian firm‐level data.
3This “extended‐gravity” pattern of export expansion is formally described in a gravity setting and structurally estimated by
Morales, Sheu, and Zahler (2014).
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on an “extended‐Chaney” information channel. Taken to the data, the question I explore in this
paper is as follows: Does a firm's previous experience importing from a country increase its proba-
bility to start exporting to that country?
I empirically test whether the probability of entering an export‐market depends on a firm's pre-
vious import experience with that country using a highly disaggregated data set on Turkish manu-
facturing firms' export and import statistics at the product‐country level for the 2003–08 period.
Turkey, a globally integrated large developing economy, is a suitable setting for this analysis as
Turkey's dollar value of exports increased by 183 per cent from 2003 to 2008, and 22 per cent of
this is explained by exporters adding new destinations to their portfolios.4
The paper's main specification aims to capture the effect of import experience on a firm's subse-
quent export entry to that market. Since there might be many factors that affect a firm's market
entry, I use multiple high‐dimensional fixed effects including firm‐year dummies to control for
inherent and time‐varying productivity, and country‐industry‐year dummies to control for variables
such as supply/demand functions and trade costs. In order to address potential endogeneity con-
cerns, I employ an instrumental variables (IV) strategy where the instrument for import experience
is the country‐specific export supply of the basket of goods that a firm has imported in the past.
Results show that having an existing supplier in the destination country raises the probability of
export‐market entry by 5.5 percentage points on average (11 percentage points in the main IV
specification)—a large number when compared to the mean export‐market entry probability of 0.8
per cent. My sensitivity analyses using different samples, experience measures and multiple instru-
ments support the findings and establish that importing from a country increases the likelihood of
export‐market entry, revealing a “market knowledge” phenomenon.
The detailed data enable me to dig deeper. First, I take advantage of country characteristics and
use gravity‐type variables such as GDP, distance, language proximity and regional trade agree-
ments (RTAs). Results show that the effect of having a supplier in the destination country does
not exist when trading with low‐income countries, but it is greater for larger and more proximate
countries. In addition, language proximity increases the size of the effect, whereas having an RTA
with the destination country decreases it. Moreover, I find that the size of a firm's domestic net-
work, measured by the number of same‐industry firms in Turkey that already export to the destina-
tion, has an additional positive effect on export‐market entry. Similarly, the size of the Turkish
immigrant community in the destination country increases the probability of entering that market,
even when the firm has a supplier in that country. Second, I analyse whether the firm and product
characteristics that proxy the strength of the firm's relationship with its supplier matter. Results
indicate that the value of imports, the number of products imported, the share of country‐specific
imports in a firm's total imports, the share of imported products that are differentiated (both hori-
zontally and vertically), the share of imports that are intermediates and the share of imports that
are technology‐intensive all have a positive and significant effect on the probability of starting to
export.
This paper's main contribution to the literature is finding for the first time that firms' country‐
specific import experience increases the probability of starting to export to that country. From a
network analysis perspective, this finding is informative, as it reveals that firms can learn about
new clients not only through their existing clients but also through their existing suppliers,
4The remaining is explained by the new exporter extensive margin (27%) and the firm‐destination intensive margin (51 per
cent). Note that the Turkish lira appreciated about 14% over the dollar during this period and thus the growth in exports
was 146 per cent in liras. See Cebeci and Fernandes (2015) for an in‐depth look at the decomposition of Turkey's export
boom in this period.
2 | ERBAHAR
indicating that the size of a firm's network can expand in both ways. Note that even though this
paper indirectly tests for network formation using an import experience proxy, the results can be
interpreted as a test for any type of market knowledge such as customs procedures, language and
culture. However, analysing the results reveals that the “supplier network” hypothesis, where firms
learn about potential clients, is more important than the alternative explanation that emphasises the
shared fixed cost component of exporting to or importing from a country. The policy implications
of my results give credit to governments’ export promotion programmes such as trade fairs that
aim to help firms find the first contact. Moreover, results indicate that large‐scale trade policy
implementations such as unilateral tariff liberalisation can have additional spillover effects by
allowing firms to find suppliers in new markets that can eventually lead to finding new clients in
those markets.
My empirical results are related to three strands of the heterogeneous firms and trade literature.
First is the literature on the importance of information frictions in export‐market entry as for-
malised by Chaney (2014) in a dynamic setting, which revealed the importance of geography in
firms' export expansion patterns. Another related work is by Allen (2014), who quantified the
importance of information frictions by examining agricultural trade data in the Philippines, and
found that a significant portion of regional price dispersion was due to limited knowledge of prices
elsewhere. Pioneered by the work of Rauch (1999), who showed that trading of differentiated
products involve higher informational barriers, this literature focused largely on social and business
networks in destination countries and their positive effect on trade: Rauch and Trindade (2002)
found that bilateral trade in differentiated products is higher between countries that have larger eth-
nic Chinese population shares; Combes, Lafourcade, and Mayer (2005) examined regional trade
within France and discovered that the size of migrant and plant networks increase trade flows of
French firms; and Bastos and Silva (2012), using Portuguese firm‐level data, found that the desti-
nation‐specific size of emigrant networks increases firms' export participation and intensity.5 The
novelty of this paper is to use import experience as a proxy of network linkages that are destina-
tion‐ and firm‐specific.
The second strand of the literature that this paper relates to is the firm‐level research on learn-
ing. Schmeiser (2012), using Russian firm‐level data, found that market‐entry costs depend on a
firm's previous experience with similar export markets, and called this “learning to export.” Simi-
larly, Defever, Heid, and Larch (2014) used Chinese firm‐level data and discovered that the elimi-
nation of the Multi Fibre Arrangement (MFA) caused Chinese firms to start exporting to non‐
MFA destinations that border MFA countries, concluding that export extensive margins have a
spatial pattern. Koenig (2009), Cassey and Schmeiser (2013), and Fernandes and Tang (2014)
examined learning through observing other exporters for France, Russia and China, respectively,
and found important “peer effects.” Similarly, Albornoz, Pardo, Corcos, and Ornelas (2012) and
Eslava, Tybout, Jinkins, Krizan and Eaton (2014) analysed learning about market‐specific demand
for Argentinean and Colombian firms, respectively, and found that geographic expansion of a
firm's exports depends on its previous export experience in other destinations. However, none of
these papers explored the firm's previous experience with the same market as done in this paper.
Finally, this paper is indirectly related to the relationship between a firm's export and import
activities. This is studied by Aristei, Castellani, and Franco (2013) who used firm‐level survey data
from 27 countries and found that a firm's importing increases its exports while a firm's exporting
5This literature is also tied to the “intermediation” of trade that emphasises breaking informational barriers, theoretically
developed by Casella and Rauch (2002) and later by Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei (2011) in a heterogeneous firms frame-
work.
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does not have any effect on its imports. Turco and Maggioni (2013) did a similar analysis for Ital-
ian firms and found that importers are more likely to start exporting. Pierola, Fernandes, and Far-
ole (2018) found that Peruvian firms that import intermediate inputs have better export
performance, including greater export‐market diversification. Muûls and Pisu (2009) found that
export status is positively correlated with both previous export and import experience and vice
versa, confirming that there are substantial sunk costs of entry. However, none of these papers
have looked at whether a firm's likelihood to enter an export‐market depends on that firm's previ-
ous import experience from that country.6,7
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical motivation,
sets up the main empirical specification and explains the identification strategy. Section 3 describes
the data and presents summary statistics. In Section 4, I present the main results with robustness
checks. In Section 5, I explore heterogeneous effects using country, firm and product characteris-
tics, and also discuss the potential learning mechanisms behind the results. Finally, Section 6 con-
cludes and discusses further research.
2 | THEORY AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
2.1 | Theoretical motivation
This paper is influenced by Chaney's (2014) theoretical setup, where firms search for clients by
using their existing dynamically formed networks. Importantly, he assumes that firms can only sell
to clients that they have met through a network. This assumption is micro‐founded in a slightly
modified Krugman (1980) model with informational asymmetries and moral hazard leading to each
consumer having access to a different mass of goods and also each firm having access to a differ-
ent mass of consumers. Each period, firms sample a mass of clients and successfully match with a
proportion of them.8 The model also assumes that this costly search can be made from the firm's
origin and also remotely through the location(s) of its existing client(s).
The number of customers firm i has in time t in location x is fi,t(x). Firms search for consumers
directly from where they are located (call it 0) and find fγμ new clients, a positive‐integer random
variable with mean γμ, where γ is the constant growth rate of firms in each location and μ is a pos-
itive parameter that describes the efficiency of search technology. In addition, firms search remo-
tely through their existing contacts in other destinations (call it y) and find gγμπ new clients, again
a positive‐integer random variable with mean γμπ, where π is a non‐negative parameter that
6The paper's policy implications are related to the export promotion literature that emphasises export diversification; see, for
example, Lederman, Olarreaga, and Payton (2010), Martincus and Carballo (2008, 2010), and Martincus, Estevadeordal,
Gallo, and Luna (2010).
7This paper is also influenced by ideas in the business economics literature. The importance of market knowledge per se is
highlighted by Kneller and Pisu (2011) who used a detailed firm‐level survey from the UK and found that the largest barrier
to export is identifying the first contact and marketing costs. Pinho and Martins (2010), by analysing a sample of 1,200 Por-
tuguese SME firms, found that the two main hindrances to exporting were (i) lack of knowledge of potential markets, and
(ii) lack of qualified export personnel. They found that lack of technical suitability, degree of competition in the sector, lack
of financial assistance and lack of qualified human resources also mattered. Several other papers including Samiee and Wal-
ters (2002) and Leonidou (2004) emphasised that market knowledge is a crucial obstacle in exporting for non‐exporters and
exporters alike.
8This happens due to a simple bargaining game between the buyer and the seller where not all interactions result in transac-
tions; see the Online Appendix of Chaney (2014).
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measures the relative efficiency of remote versus local search.9 The change in the number of con-
sumers firm i has in location x is described in the following difference equation:
fi;tþ1ðxÞ  fi;tðxÞ ¼ ∑
eγμ i
k0¼1
1½~xi;k0 ¼ x þ ∑
y∈ S
fi;tðyÞ ∑
fγμπ i;y
ky¼1
1½~xi;ky ¼ x; (1)
where fi,0(x) = 0, ∀x ∈ S ≡ a discrete set of locations, 1½: is an indicator function, fγμi and gγμπ i;y
are independent draws from their respective random variables fγμ and gγμπ , and ~xs are independent
realisations from the probability distribution g(.), where Prð1½~xi;k0 ¼ xÞ ¼ gð0; xÞ is the probability
of finding a client from origin 0 in location x.10 The first part of the right‐hand side of Equa-
tion (1) is the number of customers gained through local search, and the second part is the number
of customers gained through remote search.
I modify Equation (1) by assuming that remote search is possible if and only if a firm already
has a contact in that specific location, whether she be an existing customer or an existing supplier.
The assumption that a firm can learn about potential clients from its existing suppliers is highly
probable since the growth of the firm potentially boosts its suppliers’ sales as well, creating an
incentive for them to provide information. This results in the following equation that incorporates
“supplier networks”:
fi;tþ1ðxÞ  fi;tðxÞ ¼ ∑
eγμ i
k0¼1
1½~xi;k0 ¼ x þ
n
fi;tðxÞ þ si;tðxÞ
o
∑
fγμπ i;x
kx¼1
1½~xi;kx ¼ x; (2)
where si,t(x) is the number of suppliers firm i has in time t in location x. The first part of the right‐
hand side of Equation (2) is the same as in Equation (1) but now the second part shows that firms
can acquire new customers in x using both the existing clients and suppliers in x. Importantly,
Prð1½~xi;kx ¼ xÞ ¼ gðx; xÞ is the probability of finding a client from x in x.11
The attentive reader might inquire whether the above methodology can also shed light on firms'
search for suppliers using their existing network of clients. The short answer is no, since firms are
assumed to always search for new clients to expand their sales, whereas this might not be the case
in search for suppliers. However, in Appendix Section B, I show results that examine the effect of
export experience on import entry and find a positive but not a robust relationship.
Note that another simple way to obtain a link between import experience and export entry at
the country level is to assume that the fixed costs of exporting and importing share a component
that proxies for country‐specific variables such as customs procedures, language and culture. This
way, a shock that causes a firm to import from a country would also make it more likely to export
to that destination since it would have paid the shared component of fixed costs of trading with
that country. Even though this would not generate a lagged structure as in Chaney (2014), results
in this paper can be interpreted as a test for any type of market knowledge, and not necessarily
network formation. In Section 5.3, I contrast this alternative mechanism with the “supplier net-
work” hypothesis based on the results.
9The Online Appendix of Chaney (2014) details the micro‐foundations of these variables.
10Chaney (2014) specifies a distribution for g(y,x) in the form of αλ,yGDPxe
xy/λ, where αλ,y is a scaling constant and λ mea-
sures the geographic dispersion of new contacts. This functional form implies that the probability depends on market size,
distance, and dispersion. In reality, there might be additional factors such as cultural/linguistic similarity and institutional
quality.
11Trivially, this would imply that the probability of finding a client in x given the firm already has a contact in x would not
depend on distance since distance between x and x is zero.
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2.2 | Specification
Here, I adjust Equation (2) in order to have a testable empirical specification. Since I do not
observe the number of customers a firm has, and can only observe whether the firm is exporting
to or importing from a country, fi,t(x) and si,t(x) are latent variables inferred from the binary Fi,c,t
and Si,c,t, respectively (note that the notation for destination changes from location x to country c):
Fi;c;t ¼
1 if fi;tðxÞ>0;
0 if fi;tðxÞ ¼ 0;

Si;c;t ¼
1 if si;tðxÞ>0;
0 if si;tðxÞ ¼ 0:

Then, since the goal of this paper is to explain a firm's exporting to a specific country for the
first time, fi,t(x) on the last part of Equation (2) is zero. In addition, I attribute the randomness offγμi and gγμπ i;x to firm‐country‐specific shocks that might be time‐varying: εi,c,t. Plugging in the
probability distributions g(.) for Prð1½~xi;k0 ¼ xÞ and Prð1½~xi;kx ¼ xÞ at country‐level c, I get the
following specification:
Fi;c;tþ1 ¼ γμgð0; cÞ þ γμπ Si;c;t gðc; cÞ þ εi;c;t: (3)
In order to partial out the effect of Si,c,t, I use country‐industry‐time fixed effects to control for
(a) g(.) and (b) industry‐specific trade costs, since these are additional sources of heterogeneity that
can influence a firm's decision to export. Moreover, the empirical heterogeneous firms and trade
literature have conclusively found that firm‐specific productivity is an important predictor of
exporting.12 This would mean that εi,c,t in Equation (3) includes a firm‐time‐specific component.
Hence, to control for time‐varying productivity and other potential firm‐level factors, I include
firm‐time dummies and get the following specification:
Fi;c;t ¼ βSi;c;t1 þ δc;n;t þ ζi;t þ ɛi;c;t; (4)
where δc,n,t are country‐industry‐year fixed effects, ζi,t are firm‐year fixed effects, and ɛi,c,t are
shocks that are possibly correlated within firm and country observations. To deal with this poten-
tial correlation, I cluster the standard errors multiway by firms and countries.13 The theoretical
motivation presented in the previous section predicts that β is positive.
2.3 | Identification strategy
An important econometric concern with the specification in (4) is the possibility that the supplier
and the client are the same firm and that the import/export relationship is merely an offshoring of
a production stage. In that case, the decision to import and export are simultaneously determined
but the actual transactions occur sequentially. In OLS estimations with fixed effects, I try to allevi-
ate this issue by using 2‐year lags but my main results are based on an IV strategy where import-
ing is identified by the destination country's export supply, which is assumed to be exogenous to
Turkish firms. More specifically, I use a shift‐share instrument used by various papers such as
Hummels, Jørgensen, Munch, and Xiang (2014) and Berman, Berthou, and Héricourt (2015), con-
structed in the following way:
12See Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2012) for an extensive review of this literature.
13Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011) explain that in cases where the errors are believed to be correlated across multiple
non‐nested groups, standard errors should be computed cluster‐robust on those multiple dimensions.
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EXi;c;t ¼ ∑
h
∑
d 6¼TUR
ωi;h ðexportsÞc;d;h;t; (5)
and include the following control variable that proxies for firm‐and destination‐specific import
demand:
IMi;c;t ¼ ∑
h
∑
d 6¼TUR
ηi;hðimportsÞc;d;h;t; (6)
where d is destination country in (5) and source country in (6), h is a 6‐digit Harmonized System
(HS6) product, ωi,h is the initial weight (based on the first year of importing) of a product h in a
firm's imports during 2003–08, and ηi,h is the initial weight of a product h in a firm's exports over
the same period. Alternatively, I use average and uniform (assigning equal weights to each product
imported in 2003–08) weights as robustness checks. Also, I exclude Turkey as a destination and
source country, again to minimise endogeneity. This strategy results in the following first and sec-
ond stages which I estimate with two‐stage least squares (2SLS):
Si;c;t1 ¼ ρ lnEXi;c;t1 þ θ2 ln IM;ic;t þ δ2c;n;t þ ζ2i;t þ ɛ2i;c;t1; (7)
Fi;c;t ¼ β dSi;c;t1 þ θ1 ln IMi;c;t þ δ1c;n;t þ ζ1i;t þ ɛ1i;c;t; (8)
where dSi;c;t1 is the predicted value of import experience from (7), and all logs are created by add-
ing 1 to the value before taking the log to avoid zeros. In addition, following Chaney's proposition
that previous export experience from a country can increase the probability of entering a similar
country, I include a region experience dummy in all regressions. For this, I assign a region to each
country using the UN's 22 region classification system.
I estimate the 2SLS system using the linear probability model (LPM) due to the large number
of fixed effects despite having a binary‐dependent variable.14 Following Horrace and Oaxaca
(2006), who explain that the potential bias (and inconsistency) of the LPM vanishes when all pre-
dicted probabilities lie in the unit interval, I check and confirm that the predicted values from all
regressions lie in the [0, 1] range.15
3 | DATA
In this paper, I use two main data sets which were accessed at the Istanbul branch of the Turkish
Statistical Institute under a confidentiality agreement.16 The first database is the longitudinal
(2003–11) Foreign Trade Statistics that is based on official customs data at monthly frequency and
it reports the value and quantity of a firm's imports and exports at the country‐product (GTIP)
level.17 I aggregate the data to annual frequency to eliminate seasonal effects and merge it with
the second longitudinal (2003–11) firm‐level data set, Industry and Services Statistics, to obtain
14Non‐linear models produce inconsistent coefficients when faced with a large number of fixed effects due to the incidental
parameters problem when T is fixed; see Neyman and Scott (1948) and Lancaster (2000).
15These verifications are available on request.
16All analyses were completed there with only the output taken outside the premises after confidentiality checks.
17Turkey uses a 12‐digit GTIP (Gümrük Tarife İstatistik Pozisyonu) classification of which the first eight digits correspond
to the Combined Nomenclature (CN) tariff schedule of the EU, and the first six digits correspond to the internationally stan-
dardised Harmonized System (HS).
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information about a firm's industry (based on 4‐digit NACE classification).18 Note that the Industry
and Services Statistics database comprises firms that have at least 20 employees, whereas the For-
eign Trade Statistics data set includes all trading firms.19 Thus, I only include manufacturing firms
that have at least 20 employees to be consistent. For the benchmark results, I drop years 2009–11
as this period corresponds to the Great Trade Collapse and its subsequent trade adjustment which
might not be related to this study—these selections result in a sample of 17,327 manufacturing
firms.20 Finally, I restrict the sample to 6,716 firms that have existed for the entire 2003–08 period
and have imported and exported at least once to avoid entry/exit dynamics. In terms of destina-
tions, I use the 191 countries that Turkey has traded with in 2003–08. After rectangularising the
data set by firm‐country‐year, I drop observations where the firm has already exported to a country
previously and get an unbalanced panel. Additional data I use include the following: GDP, devel-
opment status indicators, migrant stock (from the Global Bilateral Migration database) and trade
cost proxies (based on Doing Business: Trading across Borders) from the World Bank, distance
and language proximity data from CEPII,21 and RTA data from De Sousa (2012). Trade data for
the instruments are from COMTRADE (WITS).
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the 6,716 firms' exports and imports in panels (a) and (b),
respectively. Note that the median number of countries (column (1)) served by a firm is 4 or 5 for
both imports and exports, and this reveals that the median firm is a multidestination and
multisource firm. The mean values (column (2)) are always larger than the median values indicat-
ing positive skewness, and confirms the well‐established result that there are many small traders
and a few large traders (there is concentration at the top even in this restricted sample of relatively
large firms). Similarly, the median value (column (3)) of annual exports (imports) to a country is
around 5,000 (4,000) Turkish liras in 2008—corresponding to about $4,000 ($3,000). The mean
values (column (4)) are as much as 15 times as high for exports and 24 times as high for imports,
again showing positive skewness. The number of exporters hovers around 63 to 69 per cent of the
6,716 firms, while the number of importers is about 74 to 79 per cent. Note also that these firms
make up about 40 per cent of Turkey's total trade value.22 A caveat to mention here is that since
the sample comprises large trading manufacturing firms that exist throughout the period, I am
examining a group of highly productive firms. Table 2 shows that no sector dominates the sample
of firms studied. Column (4) shows that all 23 manufacturing sectors are represented with the top
three textiles, apparel, and food and beverages sectors making 17, 14 and 10 per cent of all firms.
Columns (5) and (6) show the percentage of firms in a sector that export and import, respectively.
Looking at sectors that make up more than 1 per cent of all firms, note how the export share
18I use the NACE (Nomenclature Statistique des Activités Économiques dans la Communauté Européenne) Rev. 1.1 classifi-
cation system as reported.
19The Industry and Services Statistics also has firms that have < 20 employees, but these were randomly surveyed and are
not consistently included in the database. The total number of firms in the data set is 417,797, of which 133,502 are manu-
facturers.
20As shown in Section 4.2, including 2009–11 does not change the results.
21As explained by Melitz and Toubal (2014), language proximity is a bilateral continuous index (from 0 to 1) based on four
variables: (i) a dummy that indicates whether the countries’ official languages are the same; (ii) the probability that two ran-
dom people from the two countries speak the same language; (iii) the probability that two random people from the two
countries speak the same native language; and (iv) the closeness of the countries’ native languages based on the Ethnologue
classification.
22The rest is shared between intermediaries, small firms (<20 employees) and firms that were born after 2003 and/or died
before 2009.
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varies from larger than 80 per cent for electrical machinery and apparatus, motor vehicles, basic
metals and chemicals to a low of 55 per cent for food and beverages; for imports, the share ranges
from a high of 92% for chemicals to a low of 62% for publishing, printing and reproduction of
recorded media and furniture.
Next, I present statistics on the countries that Turkish firms engage with. Note that two‐way
country relationships are highly common as 42 per cent of firms in the sample were both exporting
to and importing from the same country in 2008. Figure 1 depicts the most popular export destina-
tions and import sources served by Turkish firms during 2003–08 in panels (a) and (b), respec-
tively. Note how the two panels have similar shadings; in fact, the correlation between the figures
in the two panels is 0.6. The figure shows that Western Europe, Russia, Central Asia and the USA
are top destinations, whereas Western Europe, China, India and the USA are top import sources.
Table A1 in Appendix A shows the 191 countries sorted by how frequently they are served by
Turkish firms and their characteristics including export/import probabilities, average entry rates,
previous experience and gravity‐type variables such as average GDP, distance to Turkey, language
proximity to Turkish and whether an RTA was in effect with Turkey during anytime in 2003–08. I
define export entry to a market as the first time a firm exports to a country. More precisely, since
the data set starts from 2003, I take the earliest possible year of entry to be 2005. This 2‐year mar-
gin helps alleviate the bias that might be introduced by sporadic exporting (e.g., a firm exporting
to a country in 2002 (which I do not observe), then not exporting in 2003, and then exporting in
TABLE 1 Turkish Firms' Trade, 2003–08
(a) Exports
Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Countries served
(median)
Countries served
(mean)
Value exported
(median)
Value exported
(mean)
No of
exporters
2003 4 7.25 $1,443 $19,424 4,256
2004 4 7.62 $1,731 $26,219 4,445
2005 4 7.95 $2,005 $29,688 4,569
2006 5 8.37 $2,485 $36,476 4,615
2007 5 8.80 $3,073 $46,625 4,581
2008 5 9.21 $3,860 $59,746 4,540
(b) Imports
Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Countries sourced
(median)
Countries sourced
(mean)
Value imported
(median)
Value imported
(mean)
No of
importers
2003 4 6.35 $1,774 $26,634 4,966
2004 4 6.62 $2,137 $37,189 5,182
2005 5 6.84 $2,145 $43,267 5,234
2006 5 6.99 $2,438 $52,353 5,270
2007 5 7.21 $2,817 $64,101 5,290
2008 5 7.29 $3,168 $77,542 5,136
Notes: All figures relate to the 6,716 firms' trade with the 191 countries. Values are in US$ and correspond to the total annual
transaction of a firm with a country, converted from Turkish liras using annual average official exchange rates reported by the
World Bank.
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2004 will not be considered an entry since I have a 2‐year margin). In the estimations, my main
independent variable for Si,c,t−1 is a dummy for import status in the previous year. However, I also
report results with a dummy for import entry in the previous year to see whether brand‐new sup-
plier relationships matter. As a third alternative, I use the number of accumulated importing years
in the previous year as a proxy for the strength of the relationship with the supplier.
In Table A1, export/import probabilities are the percentage of 6,716 firms that serve or source
from a country, averaged over the sample period. “Previous experience” (Import exp. and Export
TABLE 2 Sector characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NACE Sector No. of firms Share of total
Share of
exporters
Share of
importers
15 Food and beverages 664 0.10 0.55 0.67
16 Tobacco 7 <0.01 0.86 0.86
17 Textiles 1,114 0.17 0.59 0.79
18 Apparel 907 0.14 0.59 0.74
19 Leather and leather products 165 0.02 0.63 0.78
20 Wood and wood products 88 0.01 0.52 0.66
21 Paper and paper products 163 0.02 0.78 0.88
22 Publishing, printing and
reproduction of recorded media
127 0.02 0.57 0.62
23 Coke, refined petroleum
products and nuclear fuel
10 <0.01 0.70 0.90
24 Chemicals 249 0.04 0.81 0.92
25 Rubber and plastics 424 0.06 0.78 0.79
26 Other non‐metallic minerals 396 0.06 0.63 0.64
27 Basic metals 264 0.04 0.82 0.86
28 Fabricated metals 493 0.07 0.68 0.73
29 Machinery and equipment 606 0.09 0.79 0.82
30 Office machinery and computers 4 <0.01 0.75 0.75
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus 231 0.03 0.84 0.87
32 Radio, TV and communication
equipment and apparatus
43 0.01 0.77 0.91
33 Medical, precision and optical
instruments, watches and clocks
64 0.01 0.80 0.91
34 Motor vehicles 285 0.04 0.82 0.85
35 Other transport equipment 53 0.01 0.58 0.83
36 Furniture 357 0.05 0.73 0.62
37 Recycling 2 <0.01 0.00 0.50
Notes: NACE classification is Rev. 1.1 as reported. Share of total (column (4)) is calculated by dividing the number of firms in that
sector (column (3)) by the total number of firms in the sample (6,716) in 2008 (results for other years are similar). Share of expor-
ters (column (5)) and importers (column (6)) are computed by dividing the number of exporting and importing firms by the number
of firms in that sector, respectively. <0.01 indicates that the share is <1 per cent but positive.
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exp. in Columns (10) and (11), respectively) is the percentage of entrants to a country that had
trading experience with that country in the previous year. The table shows that there is substantial
heterogeneity among countries in terms of entry and status rates: The top destination market is
Germany with 32 per cent of firms serving that market on average, followed by Italy and Kaza-
khstan (21 per cent each), and United Kingdom (20 per cent). Interestingly, 86 countries are served
by <1 per cent of firms. On the import side, the ranking is similar: Germany (50 per cent), Italy
(44 per cent), China (28 per cent) and United Kingdom (27 per cent), with 126 countries being
sourced by <1 per cent of firms. Regarding the probability of entering a market during 2005–08,
Kazakhstan is the top “new” destination with 13 per cent entry probability.
Did new exporters to a country have previous import experience from that country? Simple cal-
culations show that 15 per cent of new export‐market entrants in 2005–08 had previous import
experience from that country. Table A1 shows that these experience indicators show substantial
heterogeneity. For instance, 39 per cent of firms that start exporting to Japan had previous import
(a) Export status
(6%–32%] (2%–6%]
(1%–2%] (0%–1%]
[0%] No data
(b) Import status
(12%–64%] (3%–12%]
(1%–3%] (0%–1%]
[0%] No data
FIGURE 1 Popular export destinations and import sources
Notes: Export (import) status is the percentage of 6,716 firms that export to (import from) a country, averaged over
the 2003–08 period. Darker shades indicate higher percentages. The correlation between export and import
percentages at the country level is 0.6.
ERBAHAR | 11
experience from there, whereas only 10 per cent of firms that begin exporting to Russia had import
experience from there. This type of heterogeneity indicates that local and remote search compo-
nents might have complementarities that depend on destination characteristics such as distance.
To get a sense of the import–export dynamics at the firm‐country level, I calculate transitional
probabilities as shown in Table 3. Note the existence of hysteresis: a non‐trader in year t will be a
non‐trader in t + 1 98 per cent of the time; on the other hand, a two‐way trader in year t will be a
two‐way trader in t + 1 62 per cent of the time. What this paper is mainly interested is the transi-
tion from importing to exporting (and continue importing but not necessarily) to a country. Note
that a non‐trader is similarly likely to start importing or exporting from a country. However, a firm
is more likely to export to a destination if it is first importing from that country relative to the case
when it is not trading with that country at all (1.55 + 7.15 = 8.70 vs. 0.82 + 0.06 = 0.88 percent-
age points).23
4 | RESULTS
4.1 | OLS‐FE results
Before turning to the main empirical analysis with the IV, I run some exploratory OLS regressions
by using alternating fixed effects (FE) that progressively get stricter to show how the coefficient
reacts. In all regressions, I include a proxy for the destination's firm‐specific import demand (ln
IMi,c,t) and a region experience dummy. Note that the unconditional probability of export entry is
0.8 per cent in the sample, revealing that entry is very rare. Summary statistics for all variables
including interaction terms to be used later can be found in Table A2 in the Appendix A.
Table 4 shows the OLS results with fixed effects getting stricter. Panel (a) has the results with
1‐year lags, and panel (b) does a robustness check with 2‐year lags. Each coefficient represents an
estimate from a separate regression. The first column has firm‐year and country‐year dummies
only, the second column has the set of preferred FE with firm‐year and country‐industry‐year dum-
mies, and finally the third column has firm‐year, country‐year, and firm‐country dummies that
minimises variation but makes sure that results stay robust.24 Comparing columns (1) and (2)
reveals that adding country‐industry‐year dummies does not change the estimated coefficients:
TABLE 3 Transitional probabilities
Trade status (t/t + 1) No trade Import only Export only Two‐way
No trade 98.41 0.71 0.82 0.06
Import only 30.14 61.16 1.55 7.15
Export only 31.35 1.44 61.23 5.98
Two‐way 6.49 16.57 14.63 62.31
Notes: All figures relate to the 6,716 firms’ trade with the 191 countries and are at the firm‐country level. Column indicates t and
row indicates t + 1.
23For this analysis, I rectangularise the data set to have a balanced panel of 6,716 firms and 191 countries.
24Since there is a large number of fixed effects, I use the “high‐dimensional” fixed effects (HD-FE) approach proposed by
Abowd and Kramarz (1999) and adjust it to three‐way HD-FE when using firm‐country FE following Carneiro, Guimarães,
and Portugal's (2012) iterative method. All regressions were run using Sergio Correia's reghdfe command for STATA that
allows including multiple HD-FE at a relatively low cost of computing power.
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Having a supplier in c in t−1 increases the probability of export entry by 3.2 percentage points—a
substantial magnitude since the unconditional export‐market entry is only 0.8 per cent. Column (3)
has the strictest specification that takes much of the meaningful variation away but still finds a
positive and significant effect of about one percentage point, again larger than the mean entry
probability. When I use import entry instead for Si,c,t−1, I find that even in this strict definition,
import entry to a country increases the probability starting to export to that country by 1.5
TABLE 4 OLS‐FE results
(a) One‐year lags
Si,c,t-1 (1) (2) (3)
Import status 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
No. of obs. 4,895,216 4,895,216 4,895,216
R2 0.05 0.10 0.56
Import entry 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.003***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
No. of obs. 3,655,951 3,655,951 3,655,951
R2 0.05 0.10 0.64
Import years 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.023***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
No. of obs. 4,895,216 4,895,216 4,895,216
R2 0.05 0.10 0.56
(b) Two‐year lags
Si,c,t-2 (1) (2) (3)
Import status 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.003***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
No. of obs. 4,895,216 4,895,216 4,895,216
R2 0.05 0.10 0.56
Import entry 0.007*** 0.006*** −0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
No. of obs. 2,427,474 2,427,474 2,427,474
R2 0.04 0.10 0.77
Import years 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.021***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
No. of obs. 4,895,216 4,895,216 4,895,216
R2 0.05 0.10 0.56
FE FY, CY FY, CNY FY, CY, FC
Notes: The dependent variable is Fi,c,t (export‐market entry). Each coefficient represents an estimate from a separate regression. All
regressions include ln IMi,c,t and a region experience dummy which are both positive and significant at the 1 per cent level (omitted
in the table for brevity). Fixed effects (FE) definitions are as follows: FY (firm‐year), CY (country‐year), CNY (country‐industry‐
year) and FC (firm‐country). Standard errors clustered multiway by firms (6,716) and countries (191) in parentheses. ***, ** and *
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively.
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percentage points in the preferred column (2). Reassuringly, even the coefficient in column (3) for
import entry is positive and significant. The third alternative explanatory variable, the number of
importing years, shows that an additional year of importing from a country increases the export‐
market entry probability by 1.2 percentage points in column (2). All coefficients have the expected
positive sign and are significant at the 1 per cent level.
One can argue that a 1‐year lag is too short to rule out the concern that a firm might make the
decision of importing and exporting from a country in the same year but start exporting after
importing which might happen in the next calendar year, and this would bias the coefficient
upwards. To deal with this concern, I lag the explanatory variable by 2 years. Table 4 panel (b)
shows that results stay qualitatively the same. More precisely, column (2) shows that a positive
import status in t−2 increases export entry probability by 2.8 percentage points. Other experience
variables are robust and the only coefficient that is not statistically significant is in column (3),
where I have firm‐country FE and use the strictest experience variable of import‐market entry in
t−2, possibly limiting enough statistical variation.
For another way to gauge the importance of importing, I create dummies for 1, 2, 3, 4 and
5 years of continuous previous experience with a country.25 Column (1) of Table A3 in the
Appendix A shows that even a single year of importing experience increases the likelihood of
export‐market entry by 1.4 percentage points, and it jumps to 4.9 percentage points for a firm with
the maximum 5 years of experience. The coefficients increase in magnitude with the number of
years and are all significantly different from each other except for between 4 and 5 years, indicat-
ing that there are diminishing returns to experience.
The OLS‐FE results presented in this section hint at a positive relationship between import
experience and export‐market entry, but the concern for endogeneity entails that these results can-
not be interpreted in a causal way. The next section uses the IV strategy described earlier to estab-
lish causality.
4.2 | IV results
Table 5 shows the results with the IV strategy. Column (1) uses the benchmark instrument with
initial weights and shows that lagged import status increases the probability of export‐market entry
by 11 percentage points—much larger than the 3.2 percentage points found without using an IV.
Column (2), which instruments for import‐market entry, shows that lagged import entry raises the
export‐market entry likelihood by 46 percentage points.26 Again, a striking result that seems to
indicate that learning about a client from a supplier can be extremely fast. Column (3) shows that
an additional year of importing increases the probability of market entry by 3 percentage points,
larger than the 1.2 percentage point effect that was found earlier. These results suggest that the
coefficients that were estimated with OLS were downward biased. One possible explanation for
this is the measurement error of the binary Si,c,t−1 in proxying for the number of suppliers a firm
has in the destination country—by instrumenting it using 2SLS, dSi;c;t1 becomes a continuous vari-
able that is potentially better at predicting the size of a firm's supplier network.27
25Five years is the maximum number of experience years allowed by the sample period (2003–08). Note that five here
means at least five years as I do not observe the earlier periods.
26Note that the import entry dummy in Column (2) equals one only when the firm starts importing from that country for the
first time. In unreported estimations, I include import re‐entries on the right‐hand side and the results do not change.
27In all 2SLS regressions, like I did for OLS regressions, I confirm that predicted probabilities lie in the unit interval.
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Columns (4–6) and (7–9) of Table 5 use average and uniform weights, respectively, as sensitiv-
ity analyses and find that results are robust with coefficients that are similar in magnitude. In all
columns, I find that lagged imports of the country from the rest of the world, which proxies for
demand shocks, increase the probability of export‐market entry as expected. Similarly, the region
experience dummy is statistically significant and has a consistent effect of 1.7 percentage points;
however, a comparison between this variable and the import experience dummy shows that they
are statistically different from each other revealing that same‐country import experience is more
important than similar‐country export experience. The F‐stat form of the Kleibergen–Paap statistic,
which measures the strength of the instruments, is always higher than the critical value of 16.38
based on a 10 per cent maximum IV size.28 The first‐stage results depicted in the lower half of
Table 5 indicate that the instrument is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level in all specifica-
tions.
Table 6 does several sensitivity analyses to the main results in columns (1–3) of Table 5.
Column (1) excludes EU countries from the sample since the formation of the EU‐Turkey
TABLE 6 IV Sensitivity analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Si,c,t-1 w/o EU w/o small w/o 2008 w/ 2009‐11 One‐year
margin
Two‐year
lags
intermed.
Import status 0.112*** 0.096*** 0.115*** 0.111*** 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.037***
(0.020) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.007)
No. of obs. 4,274,906 4,278,239 3,686,043 6,511,046 6,147,107 4,895,216 807,601
R2 (centred) 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.05
KP stat. 36.42 60.20 62.21 72.66 61.54 62.45 84.16
Import entry 0.456*** 0.380*** 0.428*** 0.545*** 0.425*** 0.416*** 0.255***
(0.085) (0.064) (0.061) (0.069) (0.051) (0.058) (0.050)
No. of obs. 3,196,855 3,193,300 2,446,778 5,557,353 4,895,216 2,427,474 603,865
R2 (centred) −0.01 0.02 −0.01 −0.04 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
KP stat. 41.59 75.15 80.91 114.46 81.32 80.23 166.64
Import years 0.033*** 0.029*** 0.040*** 0.023*** 0.041*** 0.049*** 0.012***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002)
No. of obs. 4,274,906 4,278,239 3,686,043 6,511,046 6,147,107 4,895,216 807,601
R2 (centred) 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.06
KP stat. 38.32 61.85 63.39 73.74 63.79 64.33 78.92
Notes: The dependent variable is Fi,c,t (export‐market entry). Each coefficient represents an estimate from a separate 2SLS regres-
sion. All regressions include ln IMi,c,t and a region experience dummy which are both positive and significant at the 1 per cent
level. All regressions include firm‐year and country‐industry‐year fixed effects (FE). Standard errors clustered multiway by firms
(6,716, except for columns (4) and (7) where the number of firms is 5,153 and 1,094, respectively) and countries (191, except for
columns (1) and (2) where the number of countries is 164 and 168, respectively) in parentheses. The critical value for Kleibergen–
Paap (KP) statistic based on a 10 per cent maximal IV size is 16.38. First‐stage results are omitted for brevity. ***, ** and * denote
statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively.
28This statistic is a version of the Cragg–Donald statistic adjusted for clustered standard errors.
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Customs Union in 1995 had caused many Turkish firms to be entrenched in European supply
chains, possibly diminishing the role of the “learning from supplier” hypothesis by 2003–08.
Column (1) indicates that excluding the EU does not affect the results. Column (2) excludes
countries that have less than $1B average GDP over the 2003–08 period, as the learning
mechanisms in these small countries might be quite distinct: even though they have a lower
number of potential clients, the importance of knowing a supplier might be more crucial in
accessing small‐sized networks. Results show that excluding these countries does not change
the statistical significance of the coefficients but the magnitudes slightly decrease. Column (3)
leaves out the year 2008 as the second half of 2008 corresponds to the beginning of the Great
Trade Collapse, and the coefficients are qualitatively the same. Column (4) includes three addi-
tional years (2009, 2010 and 2011), and the coefficients remain positive and significant, with
similar magnitudes.29
In column (5), I change the definition of entry and require only a 1‐year margin, meaning
the earliest entry can be in 2004. This adds more than a million observations to the bench-
mark sample and the coefficients stay qualitatively the same. In column (6), I use 2‐year lags
as I did in the OLS‐FE section and find that results are robust. Finally, in column (7), I
replace my sample of manufacturing firms with the set of non‐manufacturing intermediary
firms. These are firms whose 4‐digit NACE industry is listed as trade wholesaler or trade retai-
ler in the Industrial and Services Statistics Database.30 Since these firms do not manufacture
and simply search for export/import markets to expand, the β coefficient is less likely to be
confounded by supply‐chain linkages. As shown in Column (7), even though I have less than
a million observations due to having only 1,094 firms, the results are robust, albeit with lower
magnitudes—lagged import status increases the probability of market entry by 3.7 percentage
points for intermediaries.31 This result implies that the learning mechanism might be quite dif-
ferent between manufacturing and non‐manufacturing firms. One explanation for this finding is
due to intermediaries trading more homogeneous products as shown by Bernard, Grazzi, and
Tomasi (2015) for Italian firms.32 As will be shown in Section 5.2, the “market knowledge”
effect is larger when the basket of goods imported includes more differentiated products and/or
more inputs.
4.3 | Robustness: Multiple IVs
Thus far I have shown that instruments are strong but only assumed that they are exogenous. To
be more convinced that they do satisfy the exclusion restriction, I add a second instrument based
on Turkey's tariffs to the 2SLS system in (7) and (8);33 it is defined in the following form:
29Estimating the specification in column (4) with a crisis interaction (dummy for 2009–11) does not result in a significant
interaction term, albeit the main effect stays positive and significant.
30Like I did for manufacturing firms, I make sure that these intermediaries existed for the entire 2003–08 period to avoid
entry/exit dynamics.
31For column (7), I use firm‐year and country‐year FE since all firms are in the same “intermediary” industry disallowing
me to use country‐industry‐year FE.
32In fact, the Turkish data also reveal that manufacturers import more differentiated products and more inputs when com-
pared to intermediaries (wholesalers and retailers).
33I get MFN and preferential tariff data at the country‐HS6 level from COMTRADE (WITS).
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TTARi;c;t ¼ ∑
h
ωi;hðTurkey0s tariffsÞc;h;t; (9)
and I add the relevant additional control variable based on destination tariffs faced by Turkish
exporters:
DTARi;c;t ¼ ∑
h
ηi;h ðdestination tariffsÞc;h;t; (10)
where I use initial weights are as before. Intuitively, (9) measures the weighted average bilateral
tariff imposed by Turkey on the set of products a firm has imported, and (10) is the weighted aver-
age bilateral tariff faced by a Turkish firm on the set of products that it has exported. I exclude
TABLE 7 Multiple IVs
(1) (2) (3)
Status Entry Years
Si,c,t-1 0.055*** 0.263** 0.015***
(0.021) (0.111) (0.006)
ln(IM)i,c,t 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(DTAR)i,c,t −0.005*** −0.004*** −0.005***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Region experiencei,c,t-1 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
First‐stage
ln(EX)i,c,t-1 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.009***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
ln(TTAR)i,c,t-1 −0.006 0.008 −0.022
(0.040) (0.011) (0.136)
ln(IM)i,c,t 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(DTAR)i,c,t 0.012*** 0.002 0.037***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.014)
Region experiencei,c,t-1 0.006** 0.000 0.017**
(0.002) (0.000) (0.007)
No. of obs. 3,111,393 2,341,262 3,111,393
R2 (centred) 0.002 0.000 0.003
Kleibergen‐Paap stat. 19.24 30.18 18.88
Hansen p‐value 0.77 0.62 0.78
Notes: The dependent variable is Fi,c,t (export‐market entry). Columns differ in the variable used for Si,c,t-1. All regressions include
firm‐year and country‐industry‐year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered multiway by firms (5,506) and countries (150) in paren-
theses. EU countries are dropped in order to have meaningful variation in the tariff instrument. All logs and instruments are calcu-
lated by adding 1 to the relevant value before taking the log to avoid zeros. The critical value for Kleibergen–Paap statistic based
on a 10 (15) per cent maximal IV size is 19.93 (11.59). ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent
levels, respectively.
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EU countries from this analysis as the existence of the customs union implies that tariff changes
between EU and Turkey are de minimis, limiting statistical variation.
The system I estimate for export‐market entry with two instruments becomes the following:
Si;c;t1 ¼ ρ lnEXi;c;t1 þ θ2 ln IMi;c;t þ λ ln TTARi;c;t1 þ τ2 lnDTARi;c;t þ δ2c;n;t þ ζ2i;t þ ɛ2i;c;t1;
(11)
Fi;c;t ¼ β dSi;c;t1 þ θ1 ln IMi;c;t þ τ1 lnDTARi;c;t þ δ1c;n;t þ ζ1i;t þ ɛ1i;c;t: (12)
Table 7 shows the results; importantly, the Hansen p‐values are comfortably higher than 0.10,
which means that the exogeneity of the chosen instruments cannot be rejected. The Kleibergen–
Paap (KP) statistics are not as high as in Table 5, but they are sufficiently large for inference. Col-
umn (1) shows that previous import experience increases the probability to start exporting by 5.5
percentage points, about half the magnitude found with a single IV, but still higher than the OLS‐
FE results. Similarly, the coefficients of 26 and 1.5 percentage points in columns (2) and (3) are
lower than their corresponding results with a single IV. Note that the first‐stage results in Table 7
indicate that Turkey's tariffs are often not significant predictors of importing, whereas destination
tariffs play a role in export entry. Overall, these findings establish that a conservative estimate of
the effect of lagged import status on export entry is 5.5 percentage points.
5 | HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS AND DISCUSSION ON
MECHANISMS
After establishing that having a supplier in the destination makes a firm more likely to start selling to
that country, I now explore what contributes to this learning from suppliers. More specifically, I anal-
yse whether local and remote search for clients have complementarities that depend on destination,
firm and product characteristics, making the probability distribution g(.) a function of additional vari-
ables.34 The following two subsections explore these heterogeneities by using both OLS‐FE and the
IV strategy.35 Based on these results, I discuss potential mechanisms in the third subsection.
5.1 | Country characteristics
As detailed in Table A1 in the Appendix A, there is substantial country heterogeneity in the data.
In this section, I take advantage of this dimension by interacting the experience variable with six
gravity‐type measures: GDP, distance to Turkey, language proximity to Turkish, whether the coun-
try has an RTA with Turkey, development status and an ease of trade dummy.36 The GDP proxies
for the size of network that the initial supplier contact has access to in a given country, and this is
expected to increase the probability of the firm to find a client. If there are complementarities
34As Cavusgil and Zou (1994) and Tesfom and Lutz (2006) emphasise, the nature of export barriers largely depends on
host‐market and industry characteristics.
35Summary statistics for all interaction variables can be found in Table A2 in Appendix A.
36To create the ease of trade dummy, I divide the set of countries into two groups based on the median distance‐to‐frontier
score (based on time and cost of trading–higher scores indicate lower fixed trade costs) reported by the World Bank's Doing
Business: Trading across Borders. For each country, I use the score for the first reported year in 2006–14. Dividing the
countries into quartiles does not change the results.
ERBAHAR | 19
between local and remote search, one might argue that firms would be more likely to start export-
ing to closer destinations, even when they have a supplier contact.37 Language proximity is also
expected to increase the probability of export‐market entry as this would enable the firm to ease
its way into the network of clients that can be accessed through the supplier. For RTAs, which
have been found to increase bilateral trade between countries, the effect of importing on export
entry is not clear‐cut since RTAs might erode informational barriers and thus eliminate the need to
having an initial contact in the destination country in order to access clients.38 On the other hand,
development status, which proxies for institutional quality and thus the fluidity of networks, is
expected to increase the likelihood of export‐market entry given that a firm has a supplier. Finally,
the ease of trade dummy that indicates whether trading with that country (whether it be exporting
or importing) is relatively smooth can reveal whether the effect of import experience depends on
trade costs; if the effect is indeed stronger for destinations with larger trade costs, then this would
give support to the “shared fixed costs” hypothesis.39
Table 8 panel (a) has the OLS‐FE results, and panel (b) has the corresponding IV results. Col-
umns (1) and (6) show that the coefficients on GDP and distance are both significant with the pre-
dicted signs. This result is not surprising since there are more export opportunities in larger
countries that can be accessed easily given having a supplier, and export entry should be more
likely in more proximate countries that enable smoother communication and frequent interactions
with the existing supplier. However, the IV strategy turns the statistically insignificant coefficient
on language proximity to significant and positive—this implies that linguistic (or cultural) proxim-
ity does smooth learning. In addition, the coefficient on RTA is negative in the IV results—one
might argue that signing an RTA substitutes for having an initial contact as client networks
become readily accessible with information generated by RTAs. To give a clearer interpretation,
back‐of‐the‐envelope calculations based on column (6) indicate that having an existing supplier in
Russia increases the probability of starting to export there by 15 percentage points more than the
analogous effect for the USA, as Russia's proximity to Turkey more than offsets for its smaller
market size. Moreover, the effect for Russia is 8 percentage points larger than the one for Turkey's
top trading‐partner Germany, where the import experience effect is abated by the existence of the
EU‐Turkey Customs Union. Small and distant countries often have much lower effects, with
import experience from Thailand having a 17 percentage points lower effect than the one for Ger-
many. A small country with a substantial import experience effect is Kazakhstan with only a per-
centage point less than Russia's, thanks to the similarity of Kazakh to Turkish.
In Column (2), I interact previous importing with development status indicators and find that
the effect is non‐existent for low‐income countries (the omitted category), and significant and posi-
tive for all other countries. This result is confirmed in Column (7) with the IV strategy, and the
equality of the coefficients for the three groups cannot be rejected at the 5 per cent level. This
result reveals that having a supplier helps only in higher income countries, perhaps due to the
rigidity of business networks in low‐income countries. In Columns (3) and (8), I interact previous
importing with a dummy that equals one if the country is ranked above the median in terms of
ease of trade, using OLS and IV, respectively. The interactions are not significant, revealing that
import experience is important for export‐market entry regardless of trade costs.
37This would be the case if the probability distribution g(.) is a function of home location regardless of the location of previ-
ous contacts, as in g(0,y,x).
38See Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014) who establish that signing RTAs increases bilat-
eral trade using frontier econometric techniques with the gravity equation.
39I thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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In the rest of the table, following the literature on network effects, I examine whether having (a)
same‐industry Turkish firms that already export to that destination (number of “peers”), and (b) a siz-
able Turkish immigrant community in the destination country matter. Both of these variables are
expected to increase the probability of export‐market entry as both should erode informational barriers.
Table 8 Columns (4) and (9) show that experience matters regardless of whether there are any existing
peers. Nonetheless, the number of peers does increase the probability of market entry once interacted
with previous importing—Column (9) indicates that a one standard deviation (0.871) increase in ln
(peers) increases the probability of export‐market entry by 4 percentage points when interacted with
previous import experience. Similarly, Columns (5) and (10) show that the size of the Turkish immi-
grant community matters. Interestingly, Column (10) with the IV strategy reveals that having a sup-
plier is not helpful unless there is a Turkish immigrant community in the destination country.40
5.2 | Firm and product characteristics
In this subsection, I examine firm and product characteristics that proxy the strength of the firm's
relationship with its supplier. The variables I consider are value of imports, number of HS6 prod-
ucts imported, the value share of the country in a firm's total imports, the share of differentiated
(both horizontally and vertically) products in a firm's imports,41,42 the share of intermediates in a
firm's imports,43 and the share of imports that embody medium or high technology.”44 All of these
variables are expected to increase the probability of export‐market entry as they predict closer sup-
plier–buyer relationships. A “tighter” relationship should lead a firm to spend more time and effort
with that supplier resulting in a higher likelihood to learn about a client. Similarly, trading of dif-
ferentiated products as well as technology‐embodied goods might require a closer relationship and
enhance the transmission of market knowledge learned through importing. In addition, I conjecture
that importing an input, which goes into the firm's production function, might generate larger
learning effects due to its higher importance than, for instance, a final good. Note that I am not
using interactions here as these variables are firm‐specific, making them potentially endogenous.
Using import experience interactions would require additional instruments to identify the interac-
tions. I avoid this issue by simply replacing the lagged import experience dummy with the variable
in question; this is a caveat to bear in mind when interpreting the coefficients.
40The largest Turkish immigrant community is in Germany with about a 2 million inhabitants in 2000 (the latest year of
data availability from the World Bank). Non‐European countries such as USA, Saudi Arabia and Israel also had sizable
Turkish immigrant communities in 2000.
41I classify horizontally differentiated versus non‐differentiated goods based on the index created by Rauch. He assigns a
heterogeneity value (w: homogeneous goods, r: reference priced goods and n: differentiated goods) for each Standard Inter-
national Trade Classification (SITC) Rev.2 industry. I concord that to HS6 products using concordance tables provided by
the UN Statistics Division and bundle homogeneous and reference priced goods together as non‐differentiated products.
Results reported are with Rauch's conservative definition but using the liberal definition does not change the results.
42I proxy for a product's scope for vertical (or quality) differentiation using Khandelwal's (2010) “quality ladders.” By
examining prices and market shares of US imports at the product level, Khandelwal computes “quality ladders” for each
HS10. I concord the HS10 data to HS6 (using a weighted average measure of ladders) and divide products into two groups
based on the median of this measure.
43Products (HS6) are labelled as intermediates according to the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification.
44I concord Lall's (2000) classification at the SITC level to HS6 to label products that embody medium or high technology.
This classification is similar to the one by Hatzichronoglou (1997) which is at the International Standard Industrial Classifi-
cation (ISIC) level, but I use Lall (2000) since SITC is based on traded manufactured products.
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Table 9 panel (a) has the OLS‐FE results, whereas panel (b) has the IV results. A glance at the
two panels reveals that the coefficients have the expected positive signs with the IV magnitudes
larger than the OLS‐FE magnitudes as in the main results. I focus on panel (b) for inference. The
Kleibergen–Paap statistics are comfortably larger than the critical value of 16.38 in all columns,
indicating that the instrument is strong enough to predict these continuous variables as well. Col-
umn (1) shows that a one standard deviation (1.503) increase in ln(imports) increases entry proba-
bility by 1.5 percentage points. Column (2) has a similar interpretation: a one standard deviation
(0.162) increase in ln(no. of prod.) raises the probability of export‐market entry by 1.8 percentage
points. Column (3) shows that a country's share in a firm's imports matters in determining that
firm's export expansion. A one standard deviation (0.040) increase in this share increases export‐
market entry probability by 2.04 percentage points. Column (4) reveals that a firm that imports
only differentiated products from a country is much more likely to start exporting to that country
when compared to a firm that imports entirely homogeneous or reference priced goods. This result
is similar in column (5) where the right‐hand side is replaced by the share of imports that have
scope for quality differentiation. Column (6) indicates that an importer of mostly intermediate
goods would be more likely to start exporting to that country; in this case, a one standard devia-
tion increase has a 1.67 percentage point effect. Finally, column (7) proxies for the “closeness” of
the relationship with the supplier using the share of imports that embody technology and find a
positive and significant effect on export‐market entry.
Note that these regressions are not able to clearly identify the additional effect of the variables
since they are not interactions with the binary import experience variable. Even though the vari-
ables have a positive effect on export‐market entry, the absence of suitable additional instruments
in this case means that the firm and product characteristics results should be interpreted with cau-
tion.
5.3 | Discussion on mechanisms
The results in Section 4 show that a firm's previous experience importing from a country increases
its probability to export to that country, and a conservative estimate of this effect is 5.5 percentage
points. This result is robust to several sensitivity checks but does not identify the causal channel.
The theoretical motivation in Section 2.1 describes a setting where firms learn about potential cli-
ents from their existing suppliers in the same country. This occurs as suppliers have an incentive
to provide information about potential clients to their direct client, since this would potentially
boost their sales as well. This “supplier network” hypothesis is the leading explanation behind the
empirical results. An alternative explanation is that the fixed costs of exporting and importing
share a country‐specific component, enabling the firm to start exporting to a destination once it
has paid a part of the fixed cost through importing from that same country. This component might
proxy for variables such as customs procedures, language and culture. In this subsection, based on
the results in Sections 4, 5.1 and 5.2, I discuss whether this alternative mechanism can also explain
the patterns we see in the data.
Comparing the results in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 reveals that the IV coefficients are larger than
the OLS coefficients. This implies that the import status dummy is a weak proxy for the number
of suppliers a firm has in a destination, creating random measurement error, and causing the coeffi-
cient to be biased towards zero in the OLS regressions. By instrumenting import status using
exogenous supply levels, the binary indicator becomes a continuous variable that is potentially bet-
ter at proxying the size of a firm's supplier network. If the mechanism was indeed due to “shared
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TABLE 9 Firm and product characteristics
(a) OLS‐FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(imports)i,c,t-1 0.003***
(0.000)
ln(no. of prod.)i,c,t-1 0.037***
(0.003)
import sharei,c,t-1 0.040***
(0.005)
share of diff.i,c,t-1 0.035***
(0.003)
share of qualityi,c,t-1 0.033***
(0.004)
share of inputsi,c,t-1 0.030***
(0.003)
share of tech.i,c,t-1 0.035***
(0.004)
No. of obs. 4,895,216 4,895,216 4,895,216 4,895,216 4,895,216 4,895,216 4,895,216
R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
(b) IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(imports)i,c,t-1 0.010***
(0.001)
ln(no. of prod.)i,c,t-1 0.111***
(0.015)
import sharei,c,t-1 0.511***
(0.094)
share of diff.i,c,t-1 0.218***
(0.032)
share of qualityi,c,t-1 0.337***
(0.047)
share of inputsi,c,t-1 0.143***
(0.017)
share of tech.i,c,t-1 0.265***
(0.037)
No. of obs. 4,895,216 4,895,216 4,895,216 4,895,216 4,895,216 4,895,216 4,895,216
(Continues)
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fixed costs,” then we would not expect to find larger IV coefficients. This comparison gives sup-
port to the “supplier network” hypothesis.
Section 5.1 shows that the effect of gravity‐type variables such as GDP, distance, language
proximity and development status is amplified when the firm has been importing from that coun-
try. This result might indicate that the shared component of fixed costs is larger in bigger, more
proximate (both physically and linguistically) and richer countries. However, there is no reason
why this would be the case. On the other hand, bigger and richer countries probably have larger
and more fluid networks that are easier to access to once a supplier shows the way. Similarly,
more proximate countries enable firms to have closer interactions with their suppliers, possibly
enhancing the learning effect. The coefficient on RTAs reveals that trade agreements act as a sub-
stitute to having a supplier. This indicates that RTAs erode informational barriers, making suppli-
ers irrelevant in accessing client networks. Even though this result can support both hypotheses,
the finding that the effect does not depend on the magnitude of fixed trade costs strengthens the
“supplier network” hypothesis. Section 5.1 also shows that the learning from importing effect is
larger when (i) there are other exporters to that country in the firm's sector, and (ii) the destination
has a Turkish immigrant community. These results reveal that the stock of market knowledge a
firm has access to is valuable even when it has a supplier in the destination market.
Results in Section 5.2 also give support to the “supplier network” hypothesis as variables that
proxy for the intensity of the supplier–buyer relationship (or the number of suppliers a firm has)
should have no discernible effect on the shared component of fixed costs for exporting to and
importing from a country. However, a story where the intensity of the relationship influences the
chance of finding a client can explain why the number of imported products, and whether they are
differentiated, matter. Overall, even though both mechanisms are potentially at play in generating
the relationship between import experience and export‐market entry, the results give more support
to the “supplier network” hypothesis. If the shared fixed costs component was the leading mecha-
nism, then the effect of previous export experience should have a similarly robust effect on
import‐market entry. This is not the case as shown in Appendix B.
6 | CONCLUSION
In this paper, following Chaney's (2014) conjecture of dynamic network formation where firms
learn about potential clients using their existing clients in other destinations, I relied on an import
TABLE 9 (Continued)
(b) IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
R2 (centred) 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.06
KP stat. 63.84 43.63 33.72 25.21 42.28 69.34 38.60
Notes: The dependent variable is Fi,c,t (export‐market entry). The instrument is ln(EX)i,c,t-1. All regressions include ln IMi,c,t and a
region experience dummy which are omitted in the table. All regressions include firm‐year and country‐industry‐year fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered by firms (6,716) and countries (191) in parentheses. See the main text for the definitions of the right‐hand
side variables. The critical value for Kleibergen–Paap (KP) statistic based on a 10 per cent maximal IV size is 16.38. First‐stage
results are omitted for brevity. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively.
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experience proxy to analyse whether firms can use their existing suppliers to acquire their first cli-
ents in those countries based on an “extended‐Chaney” information channel. Previous literature on
the importance of sunk and fixed costs for the extensive margin of trade has largely ignored the
supplier dimension and thus this is the first paper that analyses a firm's export‐market entry proba-
bility by examining its other trading activity—importing.
Using a detailed data set of Turkish firms during 2003–08, I empirically tested whether the
probability to start exporting depends on a firm's previous import experience with that country
using an IV strategy. I used multiple high‐dimensional fixed effects to shut down time‐varying (i)
firm characteristics such as productivity, and (ii) country‐sector characteristics such as macro
shocks. Using the remaining variation at the firm‐country‐year level, I instrumented previous
importing with exogenous supply levels in the destination country. The IV results showed that
having a supplier in the destination country increases the export‐market entry probability by 5.5
percentage points (11 percentage points in the main IV specification). The general downward bias
in OLS‐FE coefficients was attributed to the potential measurement error of import status in proxy-
ing for the number of suppliers a firm has in a country. Several sensitivity analyses such as using
different samples, experience measures and multiple instruments showed that results are robust.
The richness of the data set enabled me to dig deeper and explore heterogeneities. Using grav-
ity‐type interactions, I found that the “learning from supplier” effect does not exist when trading
with low‐income countries, but is more substantial when trading with larger and more proximate
countries, as well as nations that speak a similar language to Turkish. The RTAs, on the other
hand, did not have a positive effect on learning. I confirmed the findings of the literature on net-
work effects by showing that the number of domestic peers as well as the size of the Turkish
immigrant community in the destination country increase the probability of export‐market entry,
even when the firm has a supplier in that country. Moreover, I found that variables that proxy the
strength of the firm's relationship with its supplier such as the share of imported products that are
differentiated are positive predictors of export‐market entry. A discussion of the results revealed
that the mechanism behind the learning effect hints to the importance of accessing supplier net-
works to learn about potential clients.
This paper contributes to the literature by documenting the “market knowledge” effect, reveal-
ing that having a supplier in the destination country is important for a firm's export‐market diversi-
fication. Whether it is learning about a country's culture, customs procedures, supply/demand
functions or simply getting into a network of a country's buyers and sellers as in Chaney (2014),
“market knowledge” is an important determinant of entering a market. These results suggest that
large‐scale trade policy implementations such as unilateral tariff liberalisation can have additional
spillover effects by allowing firms to find suppliers in new markets that can lead to new clients in
those markets. My findings also give credit to government subsidies for market research and inter-
national trade fairs where firms can find contacts to expand their geographical diversification. In
fact, Turkey implemented a legislature to provide subsidies to attend international trade fairs in
2009 and to conduct (or purchase) market research for export‐market entry for small and medium
enterprises in 2011. Analysing the implications of these policy changes is left for future research.
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TABLE A2 Summary statistics for regressions
Variable Mean SD Min. Max.
Export entryi,c,t 0.008 0.089 0 1
Import statusi,c,t-1 0.018 0.134 0 1
Import entryi,c,t-1 0.005 0.070 0 1
No. of import yearsi,c,t-1 0.059 0.392 0 5
Region experiencei,c,t-1 0.122 0.328 0 1
ln(IM)i,c,t 4.410 4.276 0 17.685
ln(EX)i,c,t-1 3.096 3.989 0 17.514
GDPc,t-1 $215B $991B $21.80M $13,700B
ln(GDP)c,t-1 23.473 2.301 16.899 30.247
Distancec 5,955 3,889 628 16,823
ln(distance)c 8.430 0.786 6.443 9.731
Language proximityc 0.230 0.153 0 1
RTAc,t-1 0.173 0.378 0 1
Low incomec 0.170 0.376 0 1
Lower‐middle incomec 0.237 0.425 0 1
Upper‐middle incomec 0.280 0.449 0 1
High incomec 0.313 0.464 0 1
Ease of tradec 0.494 0.500 0 1
Peersc,n,t-1 2.140 6.969 0 166
ln(peers)c,n,t-1 0.525 0.871 0 5.118
Migrantsc 11,227 115,144 0 2.01M
ln(migrants)c 3.526 3.220 0 14.513
Value of importsi,c,t-1 TL16,872 TL1.13M 0 TL1,040M
ln(imports)i,c,t-1 0.200 1.503 0 20.764
No. of imported prod.i,c,t-1 0.048 0.636 0 141
ln(no. of prod.)i,c,t-1 0.020 0.162 0 4.956
Import sharei,c,t-1 0.003 0.040 0 1
Share of differentiatedi,c,t-1 0.011 0.102 0 1
Share of qualityi,c,t-1 0.007 0.078 0 1
Share of inputsi,c,t-1 0.014 0.117 0 1
Share of tech.i,c,t-1 0.009 0.093 0 1
Note: Summary statistics are based on the sample used for the main IV regressions in Table 5.
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APPENDIX B
TURNING THE TABLES: SEARCHING FOR SUPPLIERS THROUGH
CLIENTS?
Here, I empirically examine whether firms can also learn about new suppliers using their existing
network of clients in a country. Results below, in a sense “turn the tables,” and replicate the main
analysis by changing the dependent variable to import‐market entry and define analogous explana-
tory export experience variables.
Table B1 shows that the effect of previous exporting on import‐market entry is very similar to
the results in Table 4, where I examined the effect of previous importing on export‐market entry.
A comparison between the two tables reveals that the learning effect seems to work in both ways.
In fact, panel (a) column (3) shows that a positive export status in t−1 increases the probability of
import‐market entry by 3.2 percentage points, equivalent to the effect found in Table 4 panel (a)
column (2).
In Table B2 I instrument having a client in the destination country with that country's exoge-
nous import demand level, created analogously as in Section 2.3. Again, similar to the findings in
Table 5, the coefficients rise in magnitude. However, panel (b) shows that using multiple instru-
ments causes the export experience variable to lose its statistical significance. Moreover, the Han-
sen p‐values in Columns (4) and (6) reveal that the exogeneity of the instruments is rejected at the
5 per cent level.45 Hence, the results found for the effect of export experience on import entry are
not conclusive and thus I relegate the analysis to the Appendix. More research is needed to under-
stand firms' search for new suppliers as the model provided by Chaney (2014) does not give a
clear prediction for this channel.
TABLE A3 Number of importing years
No. of
importing
years:
β1 (1 year) β2 (2 years) β3 (3 years) β4 (4 years) β5 (5 years)
0.014*** 0.028*** 0.037*** 0.045*** 0.049***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
H0: β i =β i+1 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.25
Notes: The dependent variable is Fi,c,t (export‐market entry) and the independent variables are number of importing year dummies.
The omitted category is “no importing experience.” The explanatory variables also include ln IMi,c,t, region experience dummy, and
firm‐year and country‐industry‐year fixed effects. Number of observations is 4,895,216 and R2 is 0.10. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses are clustered multiway by firms (6,716) and countries (191). ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per
cent levels, respectively. The last row tests the equality of coefficients, and the column entries show Prob > F.
45I exclude EU countries in order to have variation in the tariff instrument.
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TABLE B2 Effect of exporting on import‐market entry ‐ IV
(a) Single IV (b) Multiple IVs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Status Entry Years Status Entry Years
Fi,c,t-1 0.299*** 0.827*** 0.092*** 0.006 0.018 0.002
(0.039) (0.111) (0.012) (0.032) (0.130) (0.009)
ln(EX)i,c,t 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(TTAR)i,c,t 0.005 0.001 0.005
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
No. of obs. 4,908,902 3,669,128 4,908,902 3,102,216 2,332,854 3,102,216
R2 (centred) −0.07 −0.55 −0.01 0.12 0.12 0.12
KP stat. 59.51 66.91 62.68 19.24 20.86 19.11
Hansen p‐value . . . 0.04 0.32 0.04
Notes: The dependent variable is Si,c,t (import‐market entry). Columns differ in the variable used for Fi,c,t-1. All regressions include
firm‐year and country‐industry‐year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered multiway by firms (6,716 in columns (1–3), 5,506 in
columns (4–6)) and countries (191 in columns (1–3), 148 in columns (4–6)) in parentheses. In Columns (4–6), EU countries are
dropped in order to have meaningful variation in the tariff instrument. All logs and instruments are calculated by adding 1 to the
relevant value before taking the log to avoid zeros. For columns (1–3) (4–6), the critical value for Kleibergen–Paap (KP) statistic
based on a 10 per cent maximal IV size is 16.38 (19.93). First‐stage results are omitted for brevity. ***, ** and * denote statistical
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively.
TABLE B1 Effect of exporting on import‐market entry — OLS‐FE
Fi,c,t-1 (1) (2) (3)
Export status 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.013***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
No. of obs. 4,908,902 4,908,902 4,908,902
R2 0.05 0.11 0.58
Export entry 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
No. of obs. 3,669,128 3,669,128 3,669,128
R2 0.04 0.11 0.65
Export years 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.021***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
No. of obs. 4,908,902 4,908,902 4,908,902
R2 0.05 0.11 0.58
FE FY, CY FY, CNY FY, CY, FC
Notes: The dependent variable is Si,c,t (import‐market entry). Each coefficient represents an estimate from a separate regression. All
regressions include ln EXi,c,t (omitted in the table for brevity). Fixed effects (FE) definitions are as follows: FY (firm‐year), CY
(country‐year), CNY (country‐industry‐year) and FC (firm‐country). Standard errors clustered multiway by firms (6,716) and coun-
tries (191) in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively.
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